Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region, NBER-EASE Volume 8 by Changqi Wu & Leonard K. Cheng
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region,
NBER-EASE Volume 8
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38674-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_00-1
Conference Date: June 19-21, 1997
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Hong Kongâ€™s Business Regulation in Transition
Chapter Author: Changqi Wu, Leonard K. Cheng
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8480
Chapter pages in book: (p. 157 - 194)- 
Hong Kong’s Business 
Regulation in Transition 
Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
5.1  Introduction 
With  minimum  direct  government  intervention  in  private  business, 
Hong Kong is widely regarded as the land of laissez faire. Compared with 
most economies in the world, the degree of direct government involvement 
in private business in the territory is indeed rather moderate. Nevertheless, 
Hong Kong does have a history of government regulation of monopolies, 
an aspect  of  economic reality that has often been overshadowed by  its 
high degree of economic freedom. 
In this paper we  briefly review the history of regulation of monopolies 
in Hong Kong and examine the current situation. The regulated industries 
include electricity, telecommunications services, public transport, and air- 
port services. These industries are not exactly alike in their economic char- 
acteristics, but they are all subject to legal or technical barriers to entry. 
Since the provision of these services is not under sufficiently competitive 
conditions, public policy toward these industries has been devised with the 
purpose of limiting the monopolies’ exercise of market power. As in many 
other economies, regulation of monopoly in Hong Kong has evolved over 
time to cope with changes in the economic environment and structure of 
the industries. 
In section 5.2 we provide an overview of the evolution of Hong Kong’s 
regulation of monopolies and oligopolies. Section 5.3 analyzes the salient 
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features of the scheme of  control, the primary  regulatory tool used in 
Hong Kong. The impact on firm behavior and the effectiveness of schemes 
of control in achieving their goals are critically appraised in section 5.4  by 
focusing on the electricity industry. In section 5.5 we  describe the transi- 
tion from regulation to market  liberalization in the telecommunications 
service industry. Finally, the implications  of  the  regulatory  changes in 
Hong Kong and directions for further changes are discussed. 
5.2  Evolution of the Regulation of Monopolies 
The history of regulation  of monopolies in  Hong Kong is  relatively 
short. It can be  divided into three distinct phases: (1) before  1963, (2) 
1963-95,  and (3) after 1995. In the period before 1963, the regulation of 
monopolies was not a major issue in the government’s economic policy. 
From 1963 to 1995, the government regulated the public utility monopo- 
lies with a series of schemes of control. Since 1995, technological changes 
and economic development have led the government to consider ways to 
bring competition to the regulated industries. 
Prior to the 1960s, clearly defined and well-deliberated government pol- 
icy on monopolies or near monopolies virtually did not exist. Following 
the economic philosophy  of  laissez faire, the Hong Kong  government 
adopted a minimum interventionist approach to industries characterized 
as monopolies and was reluctant to play an active role in regulating them. 
This attitude was reflected clearly in a statement made by the government 
in 1921 in response to a request by the public to provide means of public 
transport between Victoria Harbor and Repulse Bay: “So long as the Gov- 
ernment continues its present policy of giving reasonable facilities for pri- 
vate enterprise to get under way it will have done all that can be expected 
of it.”’ As a result, public utility services were supplied largely by private 
firms under government franchises. 
However, that is not to say that the government never intervened in pri- 
vate business. As early as 1863, the then acting governor and commander- 
in-chief, W.  T. Mercer, set rules “for the regulation of Public Vehicles and 
Chairs and their Drivers and Bearers, and to license the Hire of Horses, 
within the Colony of Hong K~ng.”~  When public buses were introduced 
into Hong Kong in 1921, the government responded swiftly by amending 
the Vehicles and Traffic Regulation Ordinance. The amended ordinance 
gave the government new power to specify bus routes with details of the 
fares to be charged, the stopping places, and basic specifications of the ve- 
hicles. 
1. Reported in Hong Kong Telegraph, 2 April 1921. and cited by Leeds (1984, 29). 
2. Ordinance No. 6 of 1863, cited in Hall (1996, 2). Hong Kong’s Business Regulation in Transition  159 
These and other regulations set license fees, fares, standards, and penal- 
ties for malpractice. In the process, the government benefited from royalty 
fees paid by franchisees. An illuminating example is the early development 
of public bus services in Hong Kong. When public buses first appeared in 
Hong Kong in 1921, a number of bus companies entered and competed 
for business. The government decided in 1933 to grant the exclusive right 
to offer public bus service in Kowloon and the New Territories to Kow- 
loon Motor Bus (KMB). To maintain its exclusive right, KMB had to pay 
an amount as high as 20 percent of its gross revenue to the government as 
royalty during a certain period of its franchise (Leeds 1984). 
The first scheme of control was introduced in 1964, about one hundred 
years after the first traffic regulations came into existence. It symbolized 
the start of the second phase of Hong Kong’s regulatory history. In that 
year, the government decided to impose a scheme of control to regulate 
China Light and Power (CLP), the company that supplied electricity to 
Kowloon and the New Territories. Rapid expansion of industrial activities 
and the resulting surge in demand for electricity in Kowloon led to fre- 
quent blackouts and tariff increases. The public uproar against high tariffs 
and low service quality generated calls for a government takeover of CLP. 
Under threat of government expropriation, CLP proposed to limit its own 
rate of return and to set up a development fund to finance its future expan- 
 ion.^ The scheme of control was the government’s response to the situ- 
ation. 
The scheme-of-control agreement was reached between CLP and the 
government  in  November  1964, but with  retroactive  effect  to October 
1963. The agreement, which spanned a period of fifteen years, set the max- 
imum permitted rate of return on the average net fixed assets devoted to 
electricity operations at 13.5 percent. After the first scheme of control on 
CLP  was introduced, similar schemes of control spread to other industries 
where suppliers of services enjoyed significant market power. The end of 
the 1980s was the heyday of the schemes of  control, when the industries 
covered by  the schemes included electricity supply, local telephone ser- 
vices, public bus services, and airport services. 
As the schemes of control multiplied over the years, their drawbacks 
gradually became apparent. Since they did not limit price increases and 
returns were calculated on the basis of fixed assets, some companies took 
advantage of this loophole to increase tariffs and to expand their capacity, 
leading to high tariffs as well as excess capacity. 
As Hong Kong’s economy grew and technology advanced in some of 
the regulated industries, such as telecommunications, the government be- 
gan to consider alternative regulatory mechanisms to improve the regu- 
3. See Cameron (1982) for a detailed description of the company history of CLP. 160  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
lated industries’ economic performance. Price-cap regulation, an alterna- 
tive to scheme-of-control regulation, was introduced first into the local 
telephone network service market in 1993 in the hope that it would reward 
the efforts of the regulated firm to lower its costs. 
Since the early 199Os, the government has taken steps to introduce com- 
petition into markets that were previously supplied by regulated monopo- 
lies. By  now the competitive situation in a number of regulated industries 
has improved substantially. Instead of a monopoly, there are now four 
operators competing in the market for local fixed telecommunications ser- 
vices. A new bus company (Citibus) has entered the public bus market to 
compete against two incumbents. When the new airport at Chek Lap Kok 
begins operation in 1998, two firms will compete for airport cargo services 
compared with a monopoly at present, and three firms for ramp-handling 
services compared with a monopoly now. All of the schemes of control 
have been lifted by August 1997 except those for the electricity industry. 
Given the significant role played by  the schemes of control, we  shall 
analyze this mode of regulation in greater detail in the next section. We 
shall examine the mechanism behind the schemes of control, identify the 
features that distinguish them from regulations in other economies, and 
evaluate their effectiveness. 
5.3  Salient Features of Schemes of Control 
5.3.1  Objectives of Regulation 
As is well  known in the economic literature, most public utilities are 
natural monopolies due to the economies of scale or network economies 
they enjoy. In other words, a sole supplier can provide the services de- 
manded by society at the lowest possible unit cost. While efficient alloca- 
tion of resources requires an output level at which consumers pay a price 
equal to the firm’s marginal cost of production, an unregulated monopoly 
would maximize its profits by restricting output, thus causing the price to 
exceed the firm’s marginal cost. 
“First best” regulation implies setting price equal to marginal cost (i.e., 
marginal cost pricing). But given economies of scale, such a linear pricing 
rule will result in the firm’s making a loss. If subsidies to cover losses are 
considered impractical due to the usual principal-agent problem, then “sec- 
ond best” regulation would require the firm’s price to at least be equal to 
its average cost (i.e., average cost pri~ing),~  so that the firm can break even. 
If two-part tariffs are used (as they are in public utilities such as tele- 
4.  More precisely, the second-best outcome is given by  the largest output level at which 
price is equal to average cost. Hong Kong’s Business Regulation in Transition  161 
phone services and electricity), then the breakeven point will be closer to 
the first-best outcome than that under linear pri~ing.~  In this case too, 
however, the calculation of marginal cost is plagued by asymmetric infor- 
mation that is typical of the principal-agent problem. 
Schemes of control have been the Hong Kong government’s  main policy 
instruments in regulating monopolies and near monopolies in public utili- 
ties. As stated by the government, “Schemes of control exist because cer- 
tain companies provide services to the public in  a monopoly  or semi- 
monopoly situation. This makes it necessary, in the public interest, for the 
Government to establish certain guidelines (known as schemes of control) 
under which these companies will operate” (see Hong Kong Government 
1988, 2). This statement highlights the main motive behind schemes of 
control. 
At  the very beginning of every scheme-of-control agreement reached 
between a regulated firm and the government is a clause stating that the 
scheme of control should be devised (1) to allow the regulated company a 
permitted maximum return, and (2)  to provide a framework under which 
the company’s financial affairs can be monitored and tariff applications 
can be made. Clearly, schemes of control are a kind of rate-of-return regu- 
lation. If such regulation is effective, then a regulated firm would not be 
able to earn monopoly profits by  charging monopoly prices, but only a 
return that equals to its cost of capital. 
5.3.2  Basic Features 
As a kind  rate-of-return regulation,  Hong Kong’s scheme-of-control 
regulation has unique characteristics: (1) It specifies the permitted rate of 
return of the regulated firms and defines the rate base on which total re- 
turns are calculated. (2) It requires each regulated company to establish a 
development fund (DF) to finance future expansion and to maintain the 
rate of  return without frequent tariff changes. (3)  It sets a fixed rate of 
return for the entire period of the agreement, which is typically quite long. 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the common features of schemes of control. A 
regulated firm must first submit its forecast of future demand, its invest- 
ment plan, and justifications  for the investment plan  to the regulatory 
agency. After obtaining approval from the Economic Services Bureau (for- 
merly the Economic Services Branch) of the Government Secretariat, the 
regulated firm can carry out its investment and production plans. Total 
revenue from sales, less total operating cost and taxes, will first go to inves- 
tors. Debt holders receive their interest payments and equity holders re- 
5. If the monopoly can use two-part tariffs, economic inefficiency as measured by the gap 
between the unit price and marginal cost would be lessened compared with that under linear 
pricing. However, the problem of monopoly profits will be further aggravated. 162  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
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Fig. 5.1  Scheme-of-control mechanism 
ceive the permitted profit as compensation for their respective supplies of 
capital. Any surplus (or deficit) is added to (made up by  drawing down) 
the DE 
If the balance of the DF is insufficient to cover the shortfall in gross 
revenue in a particular accounting year, the government may permit the 
regulated firm to deduct from the DF in subsequent years any amount 
due to it in that year or approve an increase in tariff to cover the losses 
(Public Bus Services Ordinance, Cap 230, section 28). In addition, an an- 
nual charge of 8 percent on the average balance of the DF is credited to a 
reserve to reduce the tariff or limit tariff increases. Thus the DF  serves to 
smooth the actual rate of return, finance capital investment, and provide 
rate relief. 
5.3.3  Permitted Returns 
By definition, permitted total returns to the regulated company depend 
on (I) the rate base and (2) the permitted  rate of return.  As stated in 
scheme-of-control agreements, regulated companies and their sharehold- 
ers are entitled to earn returns that are reasonable in relation to the risks 
involved and the capital invested and retained in their businesses. 
In theory, the rate of return should be based on the cost of capital, but 
in practice it was determined through negotiation between the government 
and each regulated company. This approach has led to significant varia- 
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are calculated not only across industries but also across companies in the 
same industry. 
Rate Base 
In most schemes of control, fixed assets have been adopted as the rate 
base for the calculation of total returns. In the cases of the electricity com- 
panies CLP and Hong Kong Electric Company, the bus companies KMB 
and China Motor Bus (CMB), and Hong Kong Airport Terminal Service 
Limited,  total returns  are calculated  on the basis  of  average net fixed 
assets. In the case of Hong Kong Airport Cargo Terminals Limited, per- 
mitted total returns are calculated on the basis of gross fixed assets. One 
exception is Hong Kong Telephone Company, whose total returns were 
calculated on the basis of shareholder equity. 
Regardless of whether gross or net fixed assets are used, the assets are 
measured at their historical cost. In addition to acquisition costs for ma- 
chinery, land, and tangible assets, fixed assets also include capitalized re- 
furbishment and improvements, assets under construction, prepayments, 
and goods in transit. The costs of  construction include interest paid or 
payable on construction loans, but only up to a maximum of 8 percent 
per annum on the loan’s principal. 
Rate of  Return 
For the five companies whose permitted returns were calculated on the 
basis of their net fixed assets, the maximum rate of return ranged from 
13.5 to 18 percent per annum. The differences in the rates of returns could 
be attributed partly to differences in the undiversifiable risks of the indus- 
tries, but they were also a result of the case-by-case approach to regula- 
tion. For example, the two regulated bus companies KMB and CMB were 
permitted rates of return of  16 and 15 percent, respectively. According to 
the government, the difference in the permitted rate of return reflected the 
companies’ differential profitability before the imposition of the schemes 
of control. If that were indeed the case, then the effectiveness of regulation 
would be called into question. In particular, if the maximum rate of return 
was set at or above that corresponding to monopoly profits, the regulation 
clearly would have failed to achieve the primary objective of schemes of 
control, that is, restraining a monopolist’s market power. 
A crucial question is how to determine the cost of capital of regulated 
firms. First,  these companies were  unregulated  monopolies  before the 
schemes of control were introduced. If the profitability of an unregulated 
monopoly was used as the benchmark to set permitted return, the “oppor- 
tunity cost” of an unregulated monopoly would become its cost of capital. 
Second, a monopoly under prospect of regulation might inflate its profits 
strategically in anticipation of the upcoming regulation in order to bargain 
for a higher permitted rate of return. 164  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
Estimating the cost of  capital for a regulated industry is challenging 
both theoretically and operationally. In practice, two methods are often 
used in estimating a regulated firm’s cost of  equity capital, namely, the 
capital asset pricing model  and the dividend growth model  (see Arm- 
strong, Cowan, and Vickers  1994, 183-85).  In the capital asset pricing 
model, the cost of equity capital is measured by the risk-free rate plus the 
firm’s risk premium. The risk premium is measured by  the covariance of 
the returns of the individual firm’s stock with that of the market portfolio.6 
The higher the covariance, the higher the risk level and the higher the 
required rate of return necessary to attract private capital. 
The dividend growth model is based on the premise that the share price 
is determined by the initial dividend divided by the difference between the 
cost of equity capital and the rate of expected dividend growth. One can 
estimate the cost of equity capital by inverting that equation once the ex- 
pected dividend growth rate is known or has been estimated. 
Attempts to estimate the cost of capital of a regulated firm using either 
method are plagued by a number of difficulties, including some that are 
unique to Hong Kong. First, because the profitability of a regulated firm 
reflects the permitted rate of return, it is logically problematic to use the 
stock market return or dividend growth of  the same firm to estimate its 
own cost of capital. Second, when the permitted rate of return on debt- 
financed capital is far above the market interest rate of  long-term debt, 
which is the case in Hong Kong, shareholders will have an incentive to 
alter the debt-equity  ratio to increase the net  rate  of  return to equity. 
Therefore, by definition, the permitted rate of return would always be too 
low when compared with the “cost of equity capital” calculated in the 
above fashion. 
The difficulty of determining the cost of capital for a regulated industry 
has  implications  for  implementing  rate-of-return  regulation.  Although 
economic efficiency is improved by narrowing the gap between price and 
marginal cost, it does not follow that the lower the permitted rate of re- 
turn, the better off are consumers and society. In a simple analytical model 
without uncertainty, we  can show that the lower the permitted rate  of 
return (but still above the interest rate), the worse off society becomes. The 
underlying reason is that when the rate of return is set low, the regulated 
firm may increase its profits by expanding its capacity without necessarily 
expanding its supply. This results in greater excess capacity in the industry 
and a bigger waste to society. 
6.  The capital asset pricing model has been criticized recently both theoretically and em- 
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5.3.4  Development Funds 
A development fund is an account kept by a regulated firm to enable it 
to maintain the permitted returns and to assist in its financing of fixed 
assets. So long as the fund has a positive balance, the firm is required to 
contribute an amount that is equivalent to 8 percent of the fund’s balance 
to the “rate reduction reserve” to be used to reduce the tariff in the follow- 
ing year. Thus, when the fund grows it will lead to a reduction in prices, 
and when the fund shrinks it may trigger price increases in order to main- 
tain the rate of return. 
A positive balance of the fund allows the firm to draw from it to cover 
any shortfall in actual earnings. When the balance of the DF  is too small, 
it may not be sufficient to serve the purpose of guaranteeing the maximum 
returns the regulated firm is entitled to. However, once the DF is suffi- 
ciently large, the marginal benefit of the fund as a buffer to guarantee the 
permitted rate of return becomes small, while the cost in terms of forced 
transfer to the tariff rebate reserve becomes large. 
When the DF is used to expand  the firm’s capacity, the firm pays 8 
percent interest on the amount into the rate reduction reserve, at the same 
rate as the DF’s unused balance. Thus the additional interest cost for using 
the DF to finance capital investment is zero, so the real opportunity cost 
of using the fund for investment is the marginal benefit derived from the 
fund’s role as a buffer to smooth actual returns. It follows that the regu- 
lated firm’s dominant strategy is to expand the rate base with capital in- 
vestment financed by the DF  whenever the fund is sufficiently large. Fur- 
thermore, if the marginal benefits of the fund for the smoothing of returns 
are small because uncertainty in demand is small, then the dominant strat- 
egy would be to use the entire DF  for capital expansion. 
The design of the DF  in schemes of control bears some resemblance to 
the escrow fund mechanism proposed by Vickrey (1971). When discussing 
the pricing of public utility services in the presence of fluctuating demand, 
Vickrey proposed that any actual deviation of price from marginal cost 
could be dealt with by establishing a dual tariff system (i.e., a “reactive” 
tariff and a “retention” tariff) and an escrow fund.’ A retention tariff de- 
termines the amount of revenue that the company is entitled to retain out 
of the actual revenue. Any surplus would be put into an escrow fund. The 
company may use the escrow fund to finance investment in capacity. Thus 
the escrow fund provides an incentive for the company to maintain its 
plant capacity at an appropriate level. 
7. Vickrey’s retention tariff and reactive tariff are similar to permitted returns and actual 
returns except that tariffs are prices charged for services provided, whereas returns are based 
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Despite the apparent similarities between the DF  and Vickrey’s escrow 
fund, their functions are fundamentally different. The DF  is used primar- 
ily to protect the interest  of regulated firms, but Vickrey’s escrow fund 
is based on marginal cost pricing and is designed to maintain economic 
efficiency while  avoiding the need  for frequent changes in  the utility’s 
tariffs. 
5.3.5  Duration of Scheme-of-Control Agreements 
Schemes of control in Hong Kong take the form of long-term renewable 
agreements between the government and the regulated firms. The maxi- 
mum  permitted  rates  of  return  are fixed  for  the  entire  period  of  the 
agreements. The duration of scheme-of-control agreements, however, var- 
ies across industries. The longest period was twenty years when a scheme 
of control was imposed on Hong Kong Telephone Company in 1975. The 
effective period of the schemes of control for the two bus companies was 
set at ten years. The duration of the current scheme-of-control agreements 
for the two electricity companies is fifteen years. 
Presumably, a long-term contract offers a better incentive for the regu- 
lated firm to make long-term investments than a frequently changing regu- 
latory regime, thus providing an incentive to achieve the optimal amount 
of cost savings. However, such benefits associated with long-term agree- 
ments do not seem to be present in the case of Hong Kong’s schemes of 
control. First of all, schemes of control typically contain periodic reviews 
and the possibility of modification of the initial agreement. The review 
period was set at five years for the two electricity suppliers and two years 
for the two public bus companies. More important, since a regulated firm 
can pass its costs on to the consumers, something it cannot do under price- 
cap regulation, the incentive to save costs is not enhanced by lengthening 
the agreement’s duration. 
Most important of all, the formulas for calculating permitted returns 
have given regulated firms a perverse incentive to increase capital invest- 
ment beyond what is economically efficient and raised the total costs of 
production. As we  shall see in the following section, this effect is most 
conspicuous in the electricity industry. 
5.4  Experience with Schemes of Control: The Electricity Industry 
The electricity supply industry in Hong Kong was the first industry to 
operate under schemes of control and will probably be the last one to leave 
the schemes. It provides the best illustration of the weaknesses of schemes 
of control. Among other questions we shall ask: (1) How did the schemes 
affect the firms’ behavior? (2) What was the impact  of the schemes on 
the industry’s economic efficiency? (3)  How effective were the schemes in Hong Kong’s Business Regulation in Transition  167 
achieving their objectives? Let us first provide some background informa- 
tion about the electricity industry before answering these questions. 
5.4.1  Industry Background 
Electricity in  Hong  Kong  is  supplied by  two companies. The Hong 
Kong Electric Company Limited (HEC) supplies electricity to Hong Kong 
Island  and the neighboring  islands, while the China  Light  and Power 
Company Limited supplies electricity to Kowloon and the New Territor- 
ies. The electricity generation of CLP is carried out by its associated com- 
pany, the Castle Peak Power Company Limited (CAPCO), which is 60 
percent owned by Exxon Energy Limited and 40 percent owned by CLP, 
but the associated transmission and distribution systems are wholly owned 
and operated by CLP. 
By the end of 1996, the total installed electricity generating capacity of 
HEC was 2,955 MW. The total installed capacity of CAPCO was 7,515 
MW. In that year, electricity sales of HEC were 8,876 million kWH. This 
amount represented 28 percent of total electricity sales in Hong Kong. In 
the same year, CLP sold 22,839 million kWH of electricity, accounting for 
72 percent of the market. 
The current schemes of control on CLP and HEC came into effect on 
1 October 1993 and on 1 January 1994, respectively, due to differences in 
the two companies’ financial years. Both schemes guarantee a 15 percent 
permitted rate of return for fifteen years. The electricity companies make 
forecasts of future electricity demand and submit major investment plans 
for approval by the Economic Services Bureau of the Government Secre- 
tariat. 
The two electricity companies do not have exclusive rights to supply 
electricity in their respective territories, but each is the sole supplier in its 
own geographical area. Despite the lack of exclusive rights, there has never 
been any serious attempt by  local or overseas investors to enter either 
market, and they have not made any attempt to enter each other’s territor- 
ies either. Their networks are interconnected  by  the cross-harbor cable, 
which is designed mainly as an emergency backup facility, not for the pur- 
pose of transmitting a large amount of electricity under normal circum- 
stances. Given the nature of their schemes of control, however, there is 
really no need to enter a rival’s territory so long as one’s own fixed assets 
are allowed to grow. 
5.4.2  Effect on Firm Behavior 
In a competitive industry, a firm will choose the optimal combination 
of capital and labor to minimize its production costs. An unregulated mo- 
nopoly also has the same incentive to do so because lower costs mean 
higher profits. A monopoly under scheme-of-control regulation, however, 168  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
may not benefit directly from any cost reduction if its rate of return has 
already reached the permitted rate of return. Under these circumstances, 
the only way  for the monopoly  to increase its total profits is  through 
expansion of its fixed assets. 
The existence and magnitude of  the distortion  a la Averch-Johnson 
(1962) in Hong Kong’s electricity industry can be empirically tested due 
to a peculiarity of the regulatory regime. In the period 1964-78,  CLP was 
regulated by a scheme of control while HEC operated as an unregulated 
monopoly. Both firms have been regulated under similar schemes of con- 
trol since 1979. The periods before and after the switch provide us with an 
opportunity to test Averch-Johnson’s prediction. 
Because capital investment can be used as a means to increase profits, 
we would predict that the regulated CLP employed more capital per labor 
than the unregulated  HEC, provided that  other things were equal. But 
other things might not be equal (e.g., the two firms operated at substan- 
tially different scales), so we  would instead predict that the capital-labor 
ratio of CLP grew at a faster rate than that of HEC between 1964 and 
1978 but that the opposite would be true after 1978. 
We have found that the capital-labor ratio of the unregulated HEC re- 
mained higher than that of its regulated counterpart, CLP, throughout the 
period 1964-78.  Nevertheless, during the fifteen-year period from 1964 to 
1978, the average annual growth rate of the capital-labor ratio of CLP was 
9.06 percent while that of HEC was only 7.94 percent. Furthermore, the 
growth rates of the two firms reversed after HEC voluntarily joined the 
scheme of control. In the period 1979-96,  the capital-labor ratio of HEC 
grew at 8.82 percent  per  annum, faster  than  CLP’s 8.13 percent. The 
changes in the firms’ capital-labor ratio during these two periods are thus 
consistent with the prediction that regulated firms respond to schemes of 
control by speeding up their capital investment. 
Relatedly, Peles and Whittred (1996) have demonstrated that the Hong 
Kong electricity companies, in response to the nature of their schemes of 
control, have used more fixed assets relative to current assets than U.S. 
electricity companies. 
5.4.3  Effect on Economic Efficiency 
In short, the data on capital expenditures and employment of the two 
electricity suppliers reveal a marked difference in their investment behav- 
ior before and after the schemes of control were imposed. While the inten- 
tion of the schemes of control was to protect the consumers’ interest by 
fixing the rate of return, the regulated electricity suppliers responded to 
the schemes by  expanding their  physical capital. The loss in economic 
efficiency due to such a distortion in input combination is a cost to society. 
No less important than static allocative efficiency is dynamic efficiency, 
which measures the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) over time. Hong Kong’s Business Regulation in Transition  169 
To assess the impact of the schemes of control on the regulated electricity 
companies, we  have studied whether there are any observable changes in 
the TFP of the electricity firms before and after the schemes of control 
were introduced. Using historical data, we  make two comparisons based 
on the estimation of the regulated firms’ TPF changes: (1) the difference 
between the TFP  changes of HEC and CLP from 1970 to 1978, when CLP 
was subject to a scheme of control but HEC was not,8 and (2) the differ- 
ence between the TFP growth of HEC before and after it was under the 
scheme of control. 
The statistical results do not show any statistically significant improve- 
ment  in  the TFP for either company in  the period  1970-78,  and TFP 
growth remained insignificant in the period 1979-96,  when both firms op- 
erated under schemes of control. That is to say, the TFP growth of electric- 
ity companies in Hong Kong was insignificant in the past three decades. 
In terms of TFP, Hong Kong’s electricity industry seems to have under- 
performed  when  compared with  the electricity industry in  the  United 
States (see Ansar 1990; Gollop and Roberts 1981). During the 1950s and 
early 196Os, TFP  growth of the U.S. electric power industry was on average 
above 4 percent annually. Even though the growth slowed down signifi- 
cantly in the late 1970s and the 198Os, it remained between  1 and 2 per- 
cent.9 
To put the above findings in a broader perspective, let us compare the 
TFP growth of the electricity industry with that of Hong Kong’s unregu- 
lated gas industry. A recent  study shows that  the TFP of  Hong Kong 
China Gas grew at an average rate of about 2 percent per annum during 
the period  1975-95,  on par with the economy-wide increase in TFP in 
Hong Kong (see Kwan and Png 1994). This is in sharp contrast with the 
situation in the electricity industry in which the TFP remained stagnant 
for about thirty years. While the difference in performance between the 
two industries may be the result of many factors, scheme-of-control regu- 
lation seems like a possible cause. 
The loss in static and dynamic efficiency is better appreciated by consid- 
ering the excess generation  capacity of the two electricity monopolies. 
While schemes of control require the government regulator to review and 
approve the major investment projects of  the electricity companies, the 
mechanism does not seem to have succeeded in resisting the companies’ 
incentive to expand capacity. As a matter of  fact, both companies have 
been investing aggressively to expand their electricity generation capacity 
despite excess capacity. In 1996 HEC’s reserve margin-that  is, the differ- 
ence between installed capacity and maximum demand as a percentage of 
8. The choice of a shorter period instead of the entire period  1964-78  was dictated by 
9. The slowdown in the productivity growth rate in the U.S. electric power industry has 
data availability. 
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maximum demand-stood  at 47 percent, which was much higher than the 
international norm of 30 percent. Despite the already substantial excess 
capacity, HEC completed the installation of a new 350 MW unit in 1997 
as part of the current scheme-of-control agreement (Hong Kong Electric 
Company 1997). 
For CLP, the situation is even more serious. The growth in demand for 
electricity has slowed significantly in recent years partly due to the reloca- 
tion of local manufacturing industries to southern China, but the expan- 
sion of capacity continues unabated. The first of four 625 MW blocks of 
additional generating capacity, approved by the government in 1994, was 
installed in a new power station in  1996, and the second was installed in 
1997. The buildup in generation capacity and the slow growth in demand 
have pushed the reserve margin of CLP to over 60 percent. In addition, 
the remaining two 625 MW blocks have been scheduled to be commis- 
sioned in 1998-2001  (Hong Kong Government 1997). 
5.4.4  Effectiveness of Schemes of Control 
Profitability of Electricity Companies 
The first scheme-of-control agreement between CLP and the govern- 
ment stipulated that the regulated firm was permitted to earn a maximum 
rate of return of 13.5  percent on fixed assets regardless of the way in which 
the capital investment was financed. Later, when the scheme of  control 
was up for renewal in 1979, the revised agreements added a new feature, 
namely, fixed assets financed by  shareholder equity were allowed to earn 
a  1.5 percent premium on top of  the permitted rate of return for fixed 
assets financed by  external borrowing and “borrowing” from the DF.l0 
The shareholders of the regulated companies are guaranteed not only the 
15 percent rate of return but also the additional return from the difference 
between the permitted return on debt-financed fixed assets and the actual 
borrowing costs. 
Using the debt and equity data reported by the two electricity compa- 
nies and the assumption that the cost of borrowing was 9 percent, the net 
rate of return on equity would be around 20 percent, substantially higher 
than the 15 percent maximum permitted under the scheme. 
When questioning the effectiveness of rate-of-return regulation thirty- 
five years ago, Stigler and Friedland (1962) suggested that one should not 
look only at the profit and loss accounts of the regulated firms because 
they would usually hide the critical information from accounting state- 
ments. Whether such a practice has actually occurred may be tested indi- 
rectly by examining the fortunes of investors in regulated firms’ stocks. 
10. External borrowing includes bank loans, supplier credits, amounts payable on lease- 
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Using stock return data for HEC and CLP and adjusting for dividend 
payments, we  have calculated that the stock returns on equity for both 
firms were on average 22.35 percent, even higher than the net rates of 
return during the period  1980-96. In the same period, the rates of return 
to shareholders of  both electricity companies were higher than that of 
the Hang Sang Index, where most of the Hang Sang Index constituent 
companies were not regulated firms. 
Our findings suggest that schemes of control were ineffective in pro- 
tecting consumer interests because returns to shareholders of the regulated 
electricity companies exceeded the opportunity cost of equity capital by a 
very substantial margin. 
Tar@ 
As the other side of the coin, consumers have failed to enjoy a low-cost 
supply of electricity. To  provide an independent piece of evidence, let us 
compare the levels and rates of change of CLP and HEC tariffs during the 
period  1963-79,  when the former was regulated and the latter was not. 
The two firms’ tariffs have moved closely during this period, suggesting 
that the scheme of control did not effectively alter the pricing behavior of 
the regulated firm CLP. An international comparison shows that the level 
and rate of increase of electricity prices in Hong Kong are at the high end 
among economies with comparable conditions (table 5.1). 
Table 5.1  Average Electricity Prices in Selected Economies 
1995  1993 
Price  Price Change  Price 









































































Data sources: Data for OECD countries are from the International Energy Agency (1997). Remaining 
data are from Lam (1997) and China Light and Power Company. 
Note: All prices are in nominal terms and US$l = HK$7.8. Prices of OECD countries are the average 
prices for industry and households. 
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In sum, the regulatory experience of the electricity industry suggests 
that schemes of control have failed to achieve their main objective of re- 
straining  regulated  firms’ monopoly  power.  Moreover,  regulation  has 
given rise to abnormally high excess capacity, which might have caused 
inefficiency in  input combination and lack of productivity growth. The 
first reason behind the schemes’  failure is the nature of rate-of-return regu- 
lation, as it gives weak incentive to regulated firms to lower cost. In addi- 
tion, the formulas for calculating returns in the case of schemes of control 
have indeed provided a perverse incentive for regulated firms to expand 
their fixed assets beyond what is economically efficient and socially sens- 
ible. The second reason is asymmetric information, which makes it very 
difficult, if not impossible, for the regulator to monitor regulated firms 
effectively. As a result, it is not easy for the regulator to avoid being “cap- 
tured” by regulated firms. 
In the next section, we  shall see a different path of development in the 
local telecommunications industry, where competition has gradually re- 
placed regulation. 
5.5  From Regulation to Competition: Telecommunications Services 
The telecommunications service industry supplies a variety of services 
to different groups of customers. At the most general level, the industry 
can be divided into three segments: (1) local fixed telecommunications net- 
work services (FTNS), (2) mobile telecommunications services, and (3) in- 
ternational services. These three segments are characterized by  different 
technologies and regulatory schemes. 
The Economic Services Bureau of  the Government Secretariat is  re- 
sponsible for setting an overall policy framework. Within this framework, 
the Telecommunications Authority is the regulatory body of the telecom- 
munications industry and the administrator of  the Telephone Ordinance 
(which governs the establishment and operation of basic telecommunica- 
tions services) and the Telecommunication Ordinance (which regulates so- 
called nonbasic and competitive services). 
Facing strong competition from neighboring regions that aspire to be- 
come the top financial and business center in the Asia-Pacific region, the 
government regards it as vital to have in place a good telecommunications 
infrastructure and to provide communications services to meet local and 
regional needs. The government set three policy objectives to guide the 
development of Hong Kong’s telecommunications industry: (1) the widest 
range of high-quality telecommunications services should be available to 
the community at reasonable cost, (2) telecommunications services should 
be  provided  in  the  most  economically  efficient manner  possible,  and 
(3) Hong Kong should serve as the preeminent communications hub for 
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Competition is viewed as a mechanism that engenders efficient supply 
of services and disciplines suppliers to ensure that prices are fair to con- 
sumers. As a result, the policy framework  adopted by  the government 
seeks to create an environment that makes entry by new suppliers possible, 
provides a fair rate of return to investors, and is proconsumer. Thus pro- 
gressive liberalization and the licensing of competing suppliers are impor- 
tant aspects of the industry’s development. 
The  three  segments of  the telecommunications  service industry  are 
characterized by  different kinds of market structures. International tele- 
phone services are provided by Hong Kong Telecommunications Interna- 
tional (HKTI), an unregulated monopoly. Mobile services are in a state of 
intensive competition. The market structure of local FTNS falls between 
the two extremes, experiencing a transition from a regulated monopoly to 
a regulated oligopoly. 
5.5.1 
For quite a long time, telecommunications services have been regarded 
as an example of natural monopoly; that is, the most efficient service can 
be provided by only one service operator. Under this premise, Hong Kong 
Telephone Company (HKTC) was granted a fifty-year exclusive license in 
1925 to provide the territory with a public telephone network. In return 
for this monopoly right, HKTC was required to pay a royalty to the gov- 
ernment each year and gave concessions to the government by charging 
the government half of the regular tariff rates for its phone lines. In addi- 
tion, HKTC was required to bear the universal telephone service obliga- 
tion and seek government approval for any changes in rental charges. 
The surge in demand for telephone services in the 1950s and the early 
1960s outstripped HKTC’s ability to provide phone services, leading to 
long waiting times for telephone installation. In reaction, HKTC proposed 
a substantial increase in  rental charges to reduce waiting times and to 
finance the capacity expansion of the telephone network. The government 
initially refused the request for the rental increase but later approved a 
smaller increase in  1964. As part of the agreement, HKTC accepted a 
target return of 9 percent on average capital employed. The right of ap- 
proval for any increases in the rental charges for telephone lines remained 
in the hands of the government. 
HKTC’s requests for substantial rental increases to cover rising costs in 
the early 1970s prompted the government to introduce a scheme of control 
on HKTC when its license was up for renewal in  1975. The scheme of 
control with HKTC, while resembling that reached between the govern- 
ment and CLP, had unique features. It allowed HKTC to retain its monop- 
oly for another twenty years while limiting the maximum permitted rate 
of return on shareholder equity to 16 percent after taxes. After deducting 
total operating costs, permitted return, and taxes, 80 percent of the re- 
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Table 5.2  Residential Telephone Tariffs in Selected Economies (US.  dollars) 
Connection  Monthly Subscription  Local Three-Minute Call 
Country  1995  1994  1993  1995  1994  1993  1995  1994  1993 
Hong Kong  69  77.6  77.6  8.4  8  8  0  0  0 
Korea  10  10  10  3.4  3.4  3.4  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Singapore  56  52.4  50  5.9  5.5  5.2  0.01  0.03  0.02 
Taiwan  113  228.7  255.2  2.3  4.6  4.6  0.04  0.04  0.04 
United States  43  43.5  43.5  11.7  11.3  11.3  0.09  0.1  0.1 
Sources: International Telecommunication Union, ITU Statisrical Yearbook (Geneva, 1995); and Inter- 
national  Telecommunication Union,  World Telecommunication Development Report  (Geneva,  1995, 
1997). 
maining surplus would go to a DF while 20 percent would go to share- 
holder equity in the form of bonus shares. That is to say, in contrast with 
the schemes of control for all other utility firms, the scheme of control on 
HKTC did not cap the accounting return to shareholder equity because 
any revenue above the permitted return would be shared by the company’s 
shareholders and its DF. As a result, the real return to shareholders could 
be higher than the maximum permitted rate of return. 
Although the DF could be used to expand HKTC’s telephone network 
as well as to smooth its permitted returns, in practice it was used only for 
the latter purpose because the company had sufficient resources to finance 
its expansion of fixed assets. Like other DFs, the DF of HKTC repre- 
sented a liability to the company and would accrue interest at the rate of 
8 percent per annum on its average balance. This interest payment was 
deductible from the profits of HKTC and used for tariff relief. 
Starting in  1993, rate-of-return regulation in the local FTNS segment 
was  replaced by  new,  price-cap  regulation.  Under  the new  regulation, 
HKTC could revise the charges for its services on an annual basis but no 
more than the general inflation rate, based on the consumer price index 
(CPI) minus 4 percent (known as CPI-4). Rental charges for residential 
lines may not be increased by more than the general inflation rate less 3 
percent per annum (known as CPI-3). Residential telephone tariffs from 
1993 to 1995 (the year HKTC’s exclusive franchise expired) are given in 
table 5.2. When the tariffs are compared with those of other Asian newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) and the United States, we see that Hong 
Kong had the highest connection charges except Taiwan and the highest 
monthly rental fees except the United States. Despite the fact that local 
calls were free of charge in Hong Kong but not in the other included econ- 
omies, total monthly charges were higher in Hong Kong than in the other 
three Asian NIEs if each household made fewer than 100 to 150 three- 
minute local calls per month. Hong Kong’s Business Regulation in Transition  175 
From Regulation to Competition 
Technological changes have made the natural monopoly argument in 
granting exclusive franchising increasingly irrelevant. Digital transmission 
and fiberoptic cable technologies have drastically reduced the cost to de- 
velop networks, thus bringing down the barriers to entry. 
The expiration of the exclusive franchise of HKTC at the end of June 
1995 provided an opportunity for the government to open the local tele- 
communications  market  to competition. In that  year,  three  additional 
FTNS licenses were granted to Hutchison Communications Limited, New 
T&T Hong Kong Limited, and New World Telephone Limited for the 
provision of telecommunications services between fixed points in Hong 
Kong on a competitive basis. This move ended HKTC’s seventy years of 
monopoly in the local fixed-line telecommunications market. 
Hong  Kong’s approach  to  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
market is different from that of other economies in two respects. First, be- 
cause the exclusive  franchise for international telephone services granted to 
HKTI will not expire until 2006, in 1995 competition was introduced only 
into local FTNS. Second, consistent with Hong Kong’s free market philos- 
ophy, a market-driven open licensing approach was adopted over an alter- 
native approach of creating a duopoly by tendering for a second network. 
The open licensing approach  seems preferable both in  promoting effi- 
ciency within the industry and ensuring that consumers enjoy the full ben- 
efits of competition. 
Under the new regulatory provisions, the Telecommunications Author- 
ity has adopted a number of measures aiming to limit the market power 
of the dominant operator HKTC and to foster competition in the FTNS 
market. These measures include (1) introducing number portability to re- 
duce customers’ switching costs, (2) maintaining the universal service obli- 
gation on the dominant firm, (3)  formulating tariff-setting provisions to 
prevent  anticompetitive  pricing  behavior  by  the  dominant  firm,  and 
(4) assisting new service providers in negotiation of interconnections with 
the dominant firm. 
Number Portability. To facilitate a smooth entry by the three new FTNS 
operators and to create a level playing field, the Telecommunications Au- 
thority has introduced a number portability plan that allows residential 
and business users to keep their existing telephone numbers when they 
switch service providers. This measure has reduced the costs to HKTC’s 
existing customers when they switch to a new service provider, making the 
services offered by the new entrants more attractive to consumers. 
Universal Service Obligation. As specified in the government’s position pa- 
per of  1994, Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Policy, HKTC must carry 176  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
the universal service obligation (USO) in circumstances where HKTC re- 
mains the dominant carrier, but the thee  new local service providers are 
required to pay HKTC an amount known as the “access deficit contribu- 
tion” calculated on the basis of international calls to cover part of the 
costs of the US0 (because currently local services are still cross-subsidized 
by international services). 
In a recent report on market liberalization of local FTNS, the Con- 
sumer Council recommends that an independent universal service fund be 
established to subsidize the USO. This is clearly an improvement on the 
current system in which HKTC meets the US0 while others contribute. 
A  more  important  issue  is  to  find  a  way  to  terminate  the  cross- 
subsidization of local services by international services. 
Pricing Strategy. The tariffing rules set by  the Telecommunications Au- 
thority state that the dominant firm HKTC is prohibited from offering to 
customers discriminatory tariff discounts from their published tariffs. In 
contrast, the three new entrants are not subject to the same constraint as 
long as their individual market share does not exceed 20 percent of the 
local telephone market. 
Interconnection. Interconnection is a critical issue in the process of market 
liberalization  because  new  operators  can  only  provide  their  services 
through the incumbent firm’s established network at the initial stage of 
entry. Current government policy is to allow the terms and conditions of 
the interconnection between the new entrants’ networks and the fixed-link 
telecommunications infrastructure of HKTC to be determined through 
commercial  negotiation  on the  principle  that  the  connection  charges 
should be based on long-run incremental costs. However, if an agreement 
cannot be  reached, or the Telecommunications Authority considers the 
terms and conditions reached to be anticompetitive and against the public 
interest, the Telecommunications Authority has the power to determine 
the terms and conditions itself (Section 36A of the Telecommunication 
Ordinance). 
HKTC and the other three FTNS suppliers reached a provisional agree- 
ment on connection charges in July 1995, and the charges were set at 99! 
per minute.’’ They have not yet reached any agreement, however, about 
the charges in accordance with the principles set out by the Telecommuni- 
cations Authority. HKTC and NTT have sought the authority’s help in 
determining the charges, but the determination has yet to be made. 
1 I. The connection charges for mobile phones are 6.7# per minute, and those for value- 
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Eflect of Market Liberalization 
As an indirect indication of the effect of market liberalization on cost 
savings by the existing monopoly, let us see how HKTC responded to the 
opening of the local FTNS market. Hong Kong Telecom, the sole parent 
of both HKTC and HKTI, announced a three-year plan in March 1995 
to reduce the number  of its employees by  2,500, which represented  16 
percent of its total workforce and the largest reduction in the company’s 
history. Such streamlining did not seem to have adversely affected the per- 
formance of the company or services it provided. On the contrary, the 
growth rates of Hong Kong Telecom’s revenues from local telephone ser- 
vices have continued to be in double digits. The 12.3 percent growth rate 
in revenues in the financial year ending March 1997 is even higher than in 
previous years (Hong Kong Telecom 1997). 
As Hong Kong’s experience in opening up local  FTNS has demon- 
strated, the regulator can play an important role in the process of liberal- 
ization. Promotion of competition does not call for premature deregula- 
tion, which may set back progress toward market liberalization. Moreover, 
the regulator may have to be proactive and take measures to ensure that 
adequate competition  is  developing and  consumers’ interests  are pro- 
tected. 
5.5.2  Mobile Telecommunications Services 
Mobile telecommunications services are at present the most competitive 
segment of Hong Kong’s telecommunications market. This segment differs 
from local FTNS in at least two aspects: First, there are minimum regula- 
tory barriers to entry. The government has issued  as many licenses as 
needed to maintain competition. Second, technologies in mobile telecom- 
munications evolve rapidly. New entrants with better technology can pene- 
trate the market relatively easily, thus putting competitive pressure on in- 
cumbent operators. 
In 1994, the Telecommunications Authority conducted a review on the 
way  forward with regard to the licensing and regulation of mobile tele- 
communications services. On the basis of the review, the authority decided 
to invite applications for up to four licenses for the provision of cordless 
access services and up to six licenses for the provision of personal commu- 
nications services (PCS). This decision had a significant impact on the 
mobile phone business. In late  1995-almost  a year before the issue of 
PCS licenses-the  existing cellular operators responded to the threat of 
imminent entry by  PCS (which are expected to enjoy a cost advantage) 
with deep cuts in tariffs and prices for handsets and with aggressive adver- 
tising campaigns to increase their customer base. 
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tically no limit on the number of licenses because the Telecommunications 
Authority adopts a class licensing approach for mobile communications 
services where frequency constraints do not limit the number of potential 
operators. A license will be issued within days of application. Therefore, 
competition among paging service providers is most intense. 
Mobile telecommunications services are characterized by rapid techno- 
logical advances. The rapid changes in mobile communications technol- 
ogy illustrate the powerful force of creative destruction. A good example 
is the development of the CT2 Telepoint (i.e., the second-generation inter- 
national standard for cordless handsets that uses digital radio technology) 
market in Hong Kong. Introduced into Hong Kong in 1992, CT2 gener- 
ated a very positive response from consumers. Within two years of service 
launch, CT2 subscribership reached 170,000, representing close to 3 per- 
cent of the total population of Hong Kong. However, the CT2 system’s 
advantages  of low cost and light handsets in comparison with cellular 
phones quickly evaporated after cellular communications technology im- 
proved substantially. In  1996, all providers of CT2 services were out of 
business. 
5.5.3  International Services 
With an exclusive franchise that ends in 2006, HKTI enjoys a monopoly 
on international  telecommunications  circuits,  telephonic  services,  and 
video-telephone services connected to the public switched telephone net- 
work. 
Under both local and international pressure, in recent years the govern- 
ment has been pursuing opportunities to liberalize the international tele- 
communications segment subject to HKTI’s exclusive franchise. The basic 
approach of the government is to define the areas to which the exclusive 
license applies as narrowly as possible. 
In  March  1995, the  Telecommunications Authority  announced  that 
callback services did not constitute an infringement on HKTI’s exclusive 
franchise. Also, as nontelephonic international services such as fax and 
data communications, video-conferencing, and other value-added services 
became  increasingly popular in  the business community, the authority 
stated in May 1996 that the simple resale of HKTI’s international private 
lease circuits for fax and data services, private internal communications 
networks within companies  and organizations, video-conferencing, and 
customer mobile terminals for mobile satellite services did not breach the 
terms of HKTI’s monopoly  on international services. As a result, these 
new international services have since been open to competition. 
To limit the monopoly power of HKTI, the government has also al- 
lowed companies and organizations to “self-provide” their own external 
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tions may also provide their own international private circuits by, for ex- 
ample, directly leasing satellites for private use. The first self-provided  exter- 
nal telecommunications service (SPETS) license was issued in 1995. Since 
then, a total of seventy-three SPETS licenses have been issued. The govern- 
ment has also kept future technical innovations such as international satel- 
lite cellular phone services outside of HKTI’s exclusive franchise. 
Given the above development, the competitive condition of the market 
for international services is now vastly different from what it was in 1981 
when the twenty-five-year exclusive license was granted. This is an ex- 
ample of technological advances circumventing regulatory barriers. How- 
ever, the government has been slow in  responding to calls to liberalize 
international services and restrict the monopoly power of HKTI. The gov- 
ernment either should find a way to end HKTI’s exclusive franchise before 
2006 or should  seriously consider  imposing price caps on the unregu- 
lated monopoly. 
On 20 January  1998, however, the government announced that it had 
reached an agreement with Hong Kong Telecom, the parent company of 
HKTI, for the early surrender of HKTI’s exclusive license. The liberaliza- 
tion measures include the following: (1) External service-based competi- 
tion (such as international simple resale of voice services) will  begin  1 
January  1999. (2) External facility-based competition (such as IDD ser- 
vices over cable and satellite facilities owned by  service providers other 
than HKTI) will begin 1 January 2000. To compensate for the early termi- 
nation of  HKTI’s exclusive license, the government would provide cash 
compensation of HK$6.7 billion and terminate the royalty payment  of 
HKTI as early as 20 January 1998. The changes in the government’s posi- 
tion and market liberalization measures will prevent future losses in static 
efficiency and social waste arising from HKTI’s efforts to defend its mo- 
nopoly. More important, the forces of competition released by the agree- 
ment will improve dynamic efficiency by generating more and quicker in- 
novations in international telephone services. 
5.6  Conclusions 
Business regulation  defines the relationship  between  the government 
and business. It often alters the incentives and thus the conduct of the 
regulated firms. Hong Kong’s business regulation is in a state of transition. 
Government regulation  of monopolies by  schemes of control in Hong 
Kong reached its peak in  1980s, when  schemes were imposed on many 
public utilities, but most have now been dropped as the government has 
recognized their  drawbacks  and  started  to  introduce competition  into 
these industries. In sections 5.4 and 5.5, we used the electricity industry to 
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industry to illustrate the benefits of introducing competition into a regu- 
lated industry.’* 
Schemes of control in Hong Kong differ from rate-of-return regulation 
adopted in other economies in terms of the determination of returns, the 
presence of a development fund, the duration of agreements, and the price 
adjustment mechanism. They have failed to achieve their objectives for 
two reasons. First, like any rate-of-return regulation, the schemes provide 
a weak incentive for regulated firms to lower their costs and a perverse 
incentive for the firms to expand their fixed assets due to their peculiar 
way  of determining returns (i.e., returns depending primarily on capital 
investment). Second, asymmetric information makes it very difficult, if not 
impossible, for the regulator  to monitor  regulated firms effectively and 
avoid being captured by them. 
To introduce competition into the electricity industry, a necessary step 
would be the separation of electricity generation from its transmission and 
distribution.  The newest  technology  for  electricity generation  and the 
scale of demand in Hong Kong can accommodate many small electricity 
firms that are able to operate at the minimum efficient scale, provided the 
transmission  and distribution network  is open to them. To  achieve an 
open market for electricity, the government not only has to find a way to 
link up the transmission  networks of the two geographical monopolies 
and have it managed by a separate company (i.e., a regulated monopoly) 
but also must find a way  to introduce new  entrants into a market  that 
already suffers from huge excess capacity. 
Failure by the government to forestall the perverse developments in this 
industry years ago has resulted in a messy situation from which there is 
no easy way  out. To avoid aggravating the problem of excess capacity 
further,  some arrangement would  have to be sought to sell incumbent 
firms’ existing capacity to new entrants. However, at present no competi- 
tion and antitrust laws yet exist in Hong Kong to provide a legal basis for 
the government to impose such a solution. 
The most competitive segment of the telecommunications industry is 
that for mobile communications services because the government has im- 
posed minimal regulatory barriers to entry and because rapid technological 
innovations allow new entrants to put severe competitive pressure on in- 
cumbents. The local fixed telecommunications network service segment of 
the market comprises a dominant incumbent and three new entrants. The 
Hong Kong experience with this segment of the industry is that the regula- 
tor can play an  important role in market liberalization by ensuring that ade- 
quate competition is developing and consumers’ interests are protected. 
12. Some studies show that direct competition between electric power companies causes 
firms to operate at lower average cost, sell electricity at lower prices, and avoid excess capac- 
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The least competitive segment is that for international telephone ser- 
vices. Under an agreement with the Hong Kong government in January 
1998, HKTI’s exclusive license on international telephone services was ter- 
minated. International services provided via HKTI will be open to compe- 
tition in 1999 and international services provided via facilities of any party 
will be open to competition in 2000. 
Looking  beyond  electricity  and  telecommunications,  we  can  see 
changes in other public utility industries as well (see Cheng and Wu 1998 
for details). As indicated in section 5.2 above, a new bus company has 
entered the public bus industry to join two incumbents, whose schemes of 
control were not renewed when they expired in August 1997. In addition, 
an open tendering system has replaced private negotiation as a mechanism 
for awarding bus routes. When the new Chek Lap Kok International Air- 
port begins operation in  1998, two firms will compete for airport cargo 
services compared with a monopoly at present, and three firms for ramp- 
handling services compared with a monopoly now. 
The progress in  the past  few years has encouraged  policymakers to 
move ahead in the direction of regulatory reform and market liberaliza- 
tion. There is definitely room for both. Although the effort has already 
started to pay off, the pace of progress is uneven. The government has an- 
nounced that it intends to open more markets to competition that until re- 
cently have been governed by exclusive franchises and will encourage fur- 
ther competition in markets that have already been opened. 
These moves are expected  to have  a  positive impact  on productiv- 
ity growth in these industries. However, the territorial monopolies in the 
electricity industry remain  intact while they are still under  schemes of 
control. 
Even though competition in airport services will increase after the new 
airport is open in 1998, the nature of regulation will undergo a very funda- 
mental, and perhaps bizarre, change. Air cargo service and ramp-handling 
service providers will no longer be subject to government regulation but 
will instead be “regulated” by the Airport Authority, a government-owned 
corporation  that  has a statutory  obligation to conduct its business ac- 
cording to “prudential commercial principles.” So far no details have been 
revealed about the way in which air cargo service and ramp-handling ser- 
vice providers will be regulated. However, if prudential commercial prin- 
ciples are to be the principal guidelines for the Airport Authority’s busi- 
ness dealings with its franchisees, then the outcome would be achieved 
through negotiation between an upstream monopoly and a downstream 
duopoly or triopoly. In that case, it is not clear how well public interests 
will be served. 
Less bizarre but equally problematic is the role of government-owned 
corporations in the public transport industry, namely, the Mass Transit 
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these corporations continue to be primarily profit oriented, as they are 
now,  then the government should introduce regulation to restrain their 
monopoly power and to protect consumers’ interests. 
In conclusion, to improve its regulatory regime or to bring about greater 
competition to industries that are traditionally regulated monopolies for 
the purpose of promoting economic efficiency, the government will have 
to formulate a comprehensive and sound public policy for each industry 
to guide its future initiatives. 
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Comment  Thomas Gale Moore 
I learned a lot from Changqi Wu  and Leonard Cheng’s paper on Hong 
Kong’s business regulation. What I found most remarkable was that Hong 
Kong introduced competition into the local phone market but has main- 
tained a monopoly in the potentially more competitive international mar- 
ket. The authors report that HKTC was given monopoly rights for twenty 
years from 1975 and that 80 percent of any return over 16 percent was to 
go to a development fund. They also report that the development fund 
was exhausted in 1991. It would have been very instructive had the authors 
spelled out how the development fund approach actually worked. As I 
understand the development fund approach, the accumulated funds can 
be used either  for investment or to lower rates to consumers. Was the 
HKTC development fund exhausted because it was used for investment, 
which incidentally would go into the rate base, justifying greater profits, 
or was it used to reduce rates? Since four companies have rushed in to 
offer competition with the phone company, the latter seems unlikely. 
This brings me to a fundamental problem with regulation that is too 
often overlooked. The regulator gets most of its information from the re- 
gulatee. The regulated company has incentives to hire the best accountants 
and lawyers to make its case. The data can be presented selectively, fudged, 
or even made up. How much will demand grow? If it grows rapidly, more 
investment is needed than if it is only slowly expanding. Do the workers 
need ten urinals for every twenty workers or would five be enough? Does 
the firm need copper piping, stainless steel boilers, gold wiring, more space 
to park vehicles, better vehicles that  break  down  less often, or bigger 
offices? Must the firm have the latest computers, connections to the In- 
ternet, its own power source in case the purchased electricity fails? I could 
go on, but the idea is clear. 
The real question is, Can regulation be made to work? Or will it always 
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be a tool of the regulated to protect their franchises? George Stigler and 
Claire Friedland  (1962) in a famous paper on electric utility regulation 
failed to find that regulation lowered rates. I did a study of electric power 
rates (Moore 1970) using data from the 1960s and came to the same con- 
clusion: that is, regulation had little effect in reducing rates below what 
they would have been had the firm simply priced monopolistically without 
any controls and without fear of competition. 
Primeaux has shown from examples and statistical evidence that com- 
petition in electric power can work and has worked. He has spelled this 
out in various  studies (see Primeaux  1986). Direct competition existed 
between two or more electric power companies in forty-nine cities over 
2,500 population in the United States in 1966. He reports that competition 
causes firms to operate at lower average cost. Distribution firms that have 
monopolies fail to exhibit lower costs than those under competition. Flor- 
ida has a system of wholesale electricity competition that improves effi- 
ciency and reduces wholesale electric costs. Primeaux concludes that “di- 
rect competition is feasible between utility firms.” He also reports that 
“competition causes firms to operate at lower costs, sell electricity at lower 
prices, operate without engaging in price wars, and avoid excess capacity” 
(Primeaux 1986,422). 
Although Hong Kong’s readiness to endorse and encourage competi- 
tion in local phone service is  admirable, its failure to do so in the bus 
area is unfortunate. It has franchised four companies, each of which has 
a territorial monopoly. The government apparently argues that complete 
deregulation of public bus service is not practical because, without a mo- 
nopoly franchise, “loss-incurring services cannot be provided.” Before air- 
lines were deregulated in the United States the same argument was made. 
The airlines “proved” that without regulation they would only serve the 
biggest hubs and most cities would lose service. We  know that did not 
happen. 
Trucking companies maintained that they needed regulation to continue 
to offer service in small communities. Actually, they failed to offer service 
in places where it was not profitable, and service has improved since dereg- 
ulation. 
Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez have shown that “the benefits of privatization 
and deregulation depend critically on whether effective competition can 
be established and maintained. . . . When competition exists, deregulation 
and privatization have great potential to reduce costs and improve the 
quality of urban bus services” (1993,28). They go on to suggest that mini- 
bus services, shared-ride taxis, jitneys, or motorized tricycles often provide 
good competition. Not only does competition cut rates but it often “im- 
proves productivity and encourages more market-oriented services.” 
Universal service need not be mandated. It is noteworthy that Federal 
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fixed rate. Clearly, the costs of serving small rural areas are much higher 
than those of serving big cities. Why does FedEx do this? Because it makes 
economic sense to market universal service. 
If  there are areas in  Hong Kong to which bus service would not be 
offered because demand is too low or costs are too high, then the govern- 
ment could offer subsidies. It could ask for bids from bus companies to 
provide the service. Are jitneys permitted in Hong Kong? 
I was also struck with the limited competition in the ferry market. Why 
not competition? The ferry market is much like the bus market or the 
airline market, one that could easily be competitive. 
Hong Kong, which relies on trading and is one of the great ports of the 
world, has granted an exclusive license to one firm to provide air cargo 
services. This sector is much too important to be monopolized. Rate-of- 
return regulation will not work for the reasons that I have already out- 
lined. This system will change to a duopoly. In addition, the government 
proposes that a state-owned firm do the regulating. Although I am a great 
supporter of privatization, I find this bizarre. This new entity will “have 
no obligation to reveal the methods and terms of regulation” according 
to the authors. Who is kidding whom? Who is paying whom? A duopoly 
is an improvement over a monopoly, but more competition would be bet- 
ter yet. 
In summary, I learned a lot, especially about the problems Hong Kong 
is experiencing with making regulation work. The authors admit that the 
evidence suggests the Hong Kong program  for regulation fosters more 
fixed assets than in the United States. They report that the electric utility 
companies have great excess capacity. Regulation has fostered and in fact 
maintained  regional  monopolies  in  buses,  ferries,  and  electric  power 
plants. Faith in regulation is like Samuel Johnson’s remark on someone 
marrying for the second time, “It was  the triumph of  hope over expe- 
rience.” 
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Comment  Roger G. No11 
Wu and Cheng provide some fascinating information about the history of 
electricity and telecommunications in Hong Kong. Their paper provides 
an important piece of the larger puzzle concerning the effects of neoliberal 
reform of infrastructural industries throughout the world. Surely the 1990s 
has proved to be the decade of grand experimentation in industrial policy 
in  developed  and  developing countries  alike. The  theme  of  reform  is 
broadly similar across numerous countries: to replace ubiquitous monop- 
oly providers (usually public enterprise) with competition where possible, 
and to use regulatory instruments with much sharper incentives for cost 
minimization and technological innovation where monopoly seems dura- 
ble. Nevertheless, each country has developed some unique elements of its 
reform policy, and variation among these countries provides interesting 
and useful information about how best to organize the reform. 
My  purpose in this comment is  to place the  Hong Kong case in  a 
broader context of reform in electricity and telecommunications through- 
out the world. The Hong Kong case provides insights about several policy 
choices that reformers face in all nations. The first choice pertains to the 
regulatory institutions and methods for protecting consumers against mo- 
nopoly abuses either permanently if monopoly is expected to endure or 
temporarily  during the transition  to a market competitive enough that 
regulation is no longer needed or desirable. The second decision is about 
the scope of permitted competition: in which markets will competitors be 
allowed and where will monopoly be protected? The third decision con- 
cerns the degree to which the government will be proactive in facilitating 
competition: will it intervene to establish regulatory rules on such matters 
as vertical integration  and interconnection that anticipate and prevent 
anticompetitive actions by  the incumbent monopolist, or will it rely on 
market opportunities, private litigation, and competition policy to sort 
out the ultimate industry structure and relations among horizontal com- 
petitors? 
Although I cannot offer a definitive assessment of the situation in Hong 
Kong based solely on the essay by Wu and Cheng, my overall impression 
is that Hong Kong has been excessively solicitous in protecting the inter- 
ests of the old monopoly enterprises. The regulatory  system and back- 
ground competition policy appear to be relatively timid in imposing risks 
on incumbent firms, with the main consequence being not only less com- 
petition  than might  otherwise be possible but  also relatively inefficient 
provision of  services to customers. Indeed, I interpret the performance 
information that the authors provide about electricity and telecommunica- 
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tions in Hong Kong as confirming theoretical predictions from economics 
concerning the costly effects of regulatory rules that create perverse fi- 
nancial incentives and that limit the incursion  of competition into the 
marketplace. 
Regulatory System 
The Hong Kong system of regulating profits and prices in these sectors 
is, to the best of my knowledge, unique in the world. The authors describe 
the system as a modified “rate-of-return” regulatory system, but this ter- 
minology surely is an injustice to the remarkable perversity of the Hong 
Kong approach. With all its flaws, rate-of-return regulation actually is not 
all that horrific a means for controlling  monopoly  prices. Economists 
rightly emphasize the superiority of price-cap regulation, but prior to the 
introduction of incentive regulation schemes in the 1980s, countries that 
practiced rate-of-return regulation enjoyed clearly superior performance 
in  infrastructural industries, especially in  telecommunications. The key 
weaknesses of rate-of-return  regulation were that it imposed impossible 
information requirements on regulators and that it had the perverse effect 
that as regulators did a better job of solving their information problems- 
for  example, measuring  costs  and demand  elasticities-the  distorting 
incentives of regulation on factor proportions (the Averch-Johnson bias 
in  favor of capital-intensive  technology) became  worse. Regulators  re- 
sponded to this problem by imposing “used and useful” tests on capital 
investments, which created a burden of proof on firms to show that an 
investment was necessary and cost-effective before it could be added to 
the cost basis for setting prices. Whereas this test itself imposed impossible 
information requirements on regulators, at least it was likely to prevent 
unlimited  substitution of capital for other  inputs and excessive invest- 
ments in quality that were predicted by  the theoretical models. 
The regulatory system in Hong Kong is at best a distant cousin of this 
system. The only connection between Hong Kong’s scheme and rate-of- 
return regulation is that the latter is used to set a baseline revenue require- 
ment in the short run. In reality, all forms of economic regulation must 
have this feature. The fundamental fact of price regulation is that unless 
it falls into the extreme cases of expropriation or government-protected 
monopoly (pure “capture” by the regulated firm), in the long run it must 
satisfy two criteria: nonbankruptcy of the incumbent firm and something 
less than monopoly pricing. Even price-cap regulation is initialized and 
then updated by traditional cost-based regulation. The theoretically pure 
price-cap system, in which prices are perpetually adjusted annually ac- 
cording to some arbitrary but permanent  formula (such as the CPI-X), 
has never been implemented because no value of X  has a zero probability 
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X will cumulate over even a few years to either subcompetitive or near- 
monopoly profits and so will require adjustment. In every case in which a 
price-cap formula has been adopted, within a few years it has proved to 
be politically unacceptable for one or another reason and has been altered. 
Usually, the mistake has been to make the formula too generous, arising 
from a persistent tendency for political authorities to underestimate the 
efficiency benefits of sharp incentives. Hence, over a decade or two, X 
generally grows as regulated firms find unpredicted ways to reduce costs 
when they can keep all or most of the cost reductions. 
The crucial feature of the Hong Kong price regulation system is the 
peculiar role of the “development fund.” Firms are allowed a fixed profit, 
determined by the product of their capital investments and an allowed rate 
of return. But unlike in traditional  rate-of-return regulation, the profit 
constraint does not cap either prices or revenues. Instead, the excess of 
revenues over costs plus allowed profit is placed in a fund.’ The firm can 
borrow from this fund at 8 percent or can save the fund. In the latter case, 
8 percent  of the fund is returned to ratepayers through rate reductions. 
Thus, if the firm invests the fund, next year it earns its allowed return on 
the original capital stock plus the allowed return minus 8 percent on the 
investment. If the firm does not invest the fund, in the next period it will 
earn its allowed profit on the original investment. Hence, as the authors 
correctly reason, investing the fund, even in useless investments (“gold 
plating”), always dominates saving the fund as long as the allowed rate of 
return is less than monopoly profits. One would predict, then, that both 
electricity and telecommunications firms would embark on a mad dash to 
invest as much as possible. In fact, this is the case. Telecommunications 
has invested its fund to zero, and electricity is madly adding generation 
facilities despite widespread excess capacity. Meanwhile, customers pay 
unusually high prices for both services. 
The Hong Kong system is even worse than this, however. First, it lacks 
the feature of a standard used and useful test of rate-of-return regulation. 
Hence, the regulators apparently do not inquire whether an investment is 
worth making. As a result, overinvestment can be expected to be worse 
under the Hong Kong scheme than under the standard rate-of-return sys- 
tem. Second, once a firm invests so much that the rate-of-return constraint 
is no longer binding, there is an incentive for still more investment. The 
reason is that if any fund remains, and the firm is not reaching its rate-of- 
return target,  it can pay itself from the fund to reach its profit target. 
Hence, the Hong Kong system creates an even greater incentive for exces- 
sive capital intensity, excessive quality, and gold plating than does a rate- 
of-return scheme that lacks a used and useful test. One wonders what in 
1. In telecommunications, the firm keeps 20 percent  of the fund as profit sharing and 
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the world political officials were thinking when they adopted such a ridicu- 
lously perverse system! 
Competition versus Monopoly 
Another important feature of the Hong Kong system is that it does not 
really take seriously the possibility of introducing competition. The basis 
for this conclusion varies somewhat in the two industries, so each needs 
to be discussed separately. 
Electricity 
In electricity, the first step in moving toward competition is to allow 
entry into generation. In Hong Kong, apparently entry in generation- 
indeed, in every aspect of the industry, including retail distribution-is 
technically permitted; however, the circumstances created by the perversi- 
ties of the price regulation scheme make entry completely implausible. In 
generation,  as the  authors note, the two  monopolies that  share Hong 
Kong have so overinvested in capacity that no sensible company would 
enter, even if  the government prohibited  the entrants from building any 
more generation facilities. The reason, of course, is that the existing capac- 
ity is more than adequate to satisfy all demand for the indefinite future. 
Without a requirement  to buy power from others, the incumbents have 
neither a need nor a financial incentive to buy anything from an entrant. 
And a requirement to buy externally would just add to the excess capacity 
of the system. 
Thus the only viable means for introducing competition into this sector 
is divestiture: to split generation from transmission and distribution, and 
to create a market in which distribution companies buy power competi- 
tively. To accomplish this task would require two additional policies. First, 
because electricity distribution in Hong Kong would be a duopoly, with- 
out adding more buyers the result of a wholesale electricity market would 
be monopsony prices that prevent generation firms from recovering the 
cost of capital. Second, because generation capacity substantially exceeds 
demand in Hong Kong, for a long while the competitive equilibrium price 
also would be too low to allow the recovery of all capital costs. 
To  solve these problems requires some combination of the following 
proactive government structural policies. To  reduce concentration on the 
demand side of  the market, two possibilities could be pursued. One is 
further to divest the distribution companies, creating a half-dozen instead 
of two. Another is to use some of the development fund to connect Hong 
Kong generation facilities to power systems in neighboring areas of China, 
and to introduce competition in generation in these regions as well. The 
latter move might solve some of the excess capacity problem, but if it does 
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must be done to produce a realistic initial capitalization  for generation 
facilities. The most efficient solution would be simply to spin off genera- 
tion facilities into a number of competitive suppliers, and to subtract the 
depreciated book value of the generators from the rate base of the incum- 
bents. Unfortunately, most nations have found this approach to be either 
illegal (an uncompensated expropriation) or politically infeasible. Assum- 
ing that this approach cannot be implemented, another possibility is a 
simplified version of the “efficient components pricing rule”-to  auction 
off  generation  units (with limits on the number  of  units that  could be 
owned by  a single buyer to ensure that generation becomes structurally 
competitive) and then to subtract only the auction proceeds from the rate 
base of the incumbent companies. Generation facilities would then sell for 
prices based on their expected operating margins, not their book value or 
replacement cost (both of  which are likely to be higher than  their eco- 
nomic value). In this case, retail prices would still reflect the inefficiencies 
of the excessive investments of the incumbents, but at least the generation 
sector would face incentives for more efficient operation. 
The point behind identifying the rough dimensions of a procompetitive 
policy in electricity is to contrast the circumstances in Hong Kong with 
those that one might find in a nation that was serious about improving the 
performance of the electricity sector through the introduction of competi- 
tion. The scheme described above captures some benefits of competition 
immediately, and growing benefits over time as demand grows, generation 
equipment is retired,  and new  capacity begins  to be added  because it 
makes sense to do so, rather than because the peculiar incentives of the 
price regulation  system encourage it. At  the same time, it protects the 
investment of the incumbents, however foolish they might have been. The 
failure to introduce these reforms, then, has to be for reasons that go be- 
yond the desire to assure incumbents a nice return on their existing invest- 
ments. The behavior of the Hong Kong government is consistent with only 
two explanations: the government either is irrational or is motivated to 
perpetuate the inefficiency and high profitability of the status quo. 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications policy in Hong Kong is not nearly as anticompeti- 
tive as electricity policy. Hong Kong has allowed competition in all ele- 
ments of the industry except international calling. 
The international calling system is  worth a paragraph,  even  though 
Hong Kong is hardly alone in this area. Like nearly all countries, Hong 
Kong still succumbs to the allure of the perverse incentives of the interna- 
tional system for regulating prices. In brief, nearly all nations cannot resist 
vigorously playing the negative sum game of bloated terminating interna- 
tional access charges. In essence, the standard bilateral arrangement in 
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calling rate” (a bloated, monopoly price) to the local access carrier that 
terminates  the call. Thus receiving calls is  outrageously profitable, and 
almost everywhere these excess profits are then used to subsidize basic 
local access. But because both nations practice this pricing policy, each is 
in the position of paying roughly the same amount of subsidy for local 
access to the other, with one receiving some trivial net benefit if it termi- 
nates  more  calls than  it  originates.  Meanwhile, both  are substantially 
harmed by international prices that vastly exceed costs, in some cases by 
a factor of  one hundred  to one. This pricing policy not only causes a 
substantial deadweight loss to international callers but creates a very large 
incentive to spend money to evade the system on such things as “callback” 
and private systems. 
In other aspects of telecommunications, Hong Kong has adopted most 
of the policies necessary to promote effective competition. First, it has 
adopted number portability, which reduces the switching costs of custom- 
ers who change carriers. Second, it has sought to prevent anticompetitive 
pricing by incumbent monopolists, although the method is the crude one 
of  demanding uniform pricing. Nevertheless, because Hong Kong is so 
urbanized,  this policy is certainly less distorting than it would be in  a 
nation with a large rural sector, so perhaps the simplicity of the approach 
is worth the relatively small distortions it will create. Third, Hong Kong 
has allocated spectrum in a manner that allows competition in wireless 
telephony. Unfortunately, the paper gives us few details here, such as how 
the spectrum is allocated and what technical conditions are placed on 
the licensees that might inhibit direct competition between wireline and 
wireless service. In the United States, for example, only in the 1990s were 
radio telephone companies permitted to use technologies that provided 
less mobility but had low costs, which is the necessary step if wireless and 
wireline services are to be close substitutes. 
Unfortunately, Hong Kong has sacrificed a great deal of the potential 
benefits of competition by its regulations regarding universal service and 
interconnection pricing. The paper does not present the details of the uni- 
versal service policy, so a thorough evaluation is not possible. Some key 
missing ingredients are as follows. First, what is the penetration of the 
phone system, which is relevant to assessing whether the universal service 
subsidy is necessary to achieve penetration among households who cannot 
afford  it  or whether  it  is primarily  an unnecessary  tax subsidy system 
aimed at middle-class households and businesses. Second, the paper im- 
plies, but does not actually state, that Hong Kong practices what might 
be called gross universal service subsidies-that  is, it underprices basic 
access to everyone, not just to those who need it. If so, even if penetration 
among lower income households is nontrivial, it is achieved at a huge cost 
in terms of subsidies to those who do not need it, financed by excess prices 
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In any case, all we  know from the paper is that the incumbents carry the 
universal service obligation and in return collect huge subsidies. 
One source of  this subsidy is the interconnection charge. Briefly,  the 
interconnection charge is the price one company pays to terminate a call 
to a customer who is served by another company. In Hong Kong, the price 
that has been set by the incumbent wireline carriers is 9$ per minute. (The 
authors report that the regulators have not ruled on this fee.) This price is 
outrageously high in comparison to costs. In most countries, the price per 
minute for local calls, originating and terminating in the same company, 
is less than this. Prices for mobile phone carriers are 6.7$ and for value- 
added carriers (those who lease facilities from the incumbent carriers) are 
4.2$. These, too, are ridiculously high and are clearly designed to inhibit 
competition. In Hong Kong, the authors tell us that residential customers 
have free local calling. But a competing local access provider must pay the 
interconnection charge if its customer calls a customer of the incumbent. 
In the pricing domain, the paper provides data from the International 
Telecommunication Union  (ITU)  about  residential  telephone pricing. 
These data are very inaccurate for the United States and so distort the 
comparisons. The ITU data for the  United  States are wrong on three 
counts. First, the monthly service charge is understated because it does 
not include the “customer access charge” for long-distance service (which 
is  mandatory).  Second, the price reported  in  the table is  the “lifeline” 
price, available to households that have low incomes. The actual average 
monthly access price in the United States is about $18 for ordinary house- 
holds and $1 1 for low-income households, including both local and long- 
distance access charges.2 Third, the usage charge is  wrong because it is 
actually the long-distance usage rate charged by  one carrier (New York 
Telephone) for calls outside of a customer’s local calling area (but not so 
far as to be picked up by a long-distance carrier). In reality, the vast major- 
ity of local customers have free local calling, and very few calls are actually 
charged the  rate  reported  by  the  ITU.  Finally, price comparisons are 
meaningless without including all calling prices, not just the price of  a 
local call. The main reason for high access prices in the United States is 
that interconnection fees and hence prices for long-distance calls are far 
lower than elsewhere. Indeed, 9$ a minute is closer to the price of a 2,500- 
mile long-distance call in the United States than to a local call, even for 
business customers who buy local measured service. 
The important fact about the table of telephone prices is how low resi- 
dential access charges are. One cannot imagine a circumstance in which 
the average cost of providing service is anywhere near this low, even if the 
2. For comparisons of the entire pricing structure in Japan and the United States, see No11 
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incumbent carrier is highly efficient. Hence, the Hong Kong system must 
feature other prices that are far above cost and that generate access subsi- 
dies. Because access demand is very price inelastic, a nation with low ac- 
cess prices inevitably will have a very inefficient telephone system-and 
an incumbent telephone company that is reluctant to make investments to 
provide access service to customers who do not buy the highly profitable 
services. 
The solution to this problem is realistic pricing. One benefit of competi- 
tive entry is  that it attacks massive cross-subsidy systems by  attracting 
entrants to services that are heavily taxed. The only effective ways to stop 
this entry are either to prohibit it or to tax it. Apparently Hong Kong has 
tried the latter by  imposing very high interconnection fees in  order to 
protect an inefficient price structure. 
Comparing Electricity and Telephones: A Paradox 
The electricity and telephone policies seem to have quite different mo- 
tives and consequences. In electricity, the policy seems consistent with a 
capture story: incumbent firms make supracompetitive profits, and prices 
seem to be very high across the board. In telecommunications, the policy 
is protective of incumbent  wireline carriers, but not to the degree that 
appears to have arisen in electricity. Instead, the policy seems to be to en- 
gage in a great deal of cross-subsidization of access by international call- 
ing, radio telephony, and other things unspecified in the paper. The para- 
dox is why these policies are so different. 
The  authors  offer  two  characterizations of  policy  that  inferentially 
might provide an explanation. First, the authors state early on that some 
aspects of these industries might be natural monopolies. The subsequent 
analysis of the two industries, however, is not consistent with this explana- 
tion, for generation remains monopolized  even though experience else- 
where has demonstrated that it need not be. Second, the authors state that 
the government regards advanced telecommunications services as essen- 
tial to continued economic progress in the modern world economy. But 
this belief, even if true, is not consistent with policy, for the effect of policy 
is to tax usage, which taxes advanced services, in order to subsidize ordi- 
nary telephone access. 
The puzzle, then, is what in the political economy of Hong Kong has 
caused the divergence in policy between the two sectors? The basis for the 
decision to let telecommunications carriers have profit sharing, but not 
the electric utility, is far from obvious: why do these policies differ? Hong 
Kong has chosen two quite different ways to encourage inefficiency in elec- 
tricity and telecommunications, with apparently different lineups of bene- 
ficiaries for these distorting policies. An interesting question is why these 
differences were adopted. 194  Changqi Wu and Leonard K. Cheng 
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